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The entire edifice of normative or welfare economics rests  on consumers'  sovereignty, 
i.e.  the assumption that individuals know what is  best for them;  that they make 
unconstrained decisions in the market; and  that this will  lead to  maximum welfare not just 
for the individuals but also  for society.  Maximising consumer welfare thus provides the 
ultimate basis of every normative prescription in  economics,  including those about 
optimum trade policies, cost/benefit analysis,  price regulation and so  on.  This is  the 
foundation stone for the  justification of the market model,  with consumption as  t:le 
driving force of the economic system. 1 
Yet this edifice  is  astoundingly fragile.  Neither psychology, nor logic,  nor morality 
provide firm support for a consumer sovereignty approach to  welfare;  indeed in many 
respects they challenge it.  Common sense suggests  this is  so,  as  evidenced by  the fact that 
consumer sovereignty is  consistent with famine in  the midst of plenty, high and rising 
levels of criminality, psychological depression and  suicides, overwork for some and 
unemployment for others,  boring,  repetitive and exhausting work,  unacceptable levels of 
inequality within and  between countries,  and high levels of poverty.  Moreover, there  is  a 
built in 'dissatisfaction trigger'  in  the way  modern economies are organised, so  that levels 
of welfare frequently do not rise even  among those whose incomes are rising  because the 
content of what constitutes a satisfactory level  of consumption is  continuously changing, 
requiring more and more resources  for its  realisation.  However fast world economic 
growth is,  the  tide of expectations and  desires moves even faster:  this is  not just a 
temporary phase,  but built into the way  that the global capitalist economy operates. 
This note explores some of the  weaknesses underlying the equation of 'consumers 
sovereignty' with welfare optimisation and  the consumption driven market system which 
it supports.  The first part explores some problems in  a static setting.  The second part 
considers the  role consumption plays in  the dynamic global economy.  The arguments in 
This  has  been  elaborated in many  places:  see e.g. 
Little,  1957. the first  section point to  some of the weaknesses  in  the  basis of modem welfare theory; 
the second section shows the damaging implications,  at a global  level,  of adopting a 
consumer sovereignty approach to  the organisation of the  world economy.  Section III 
attempts to  identify alternatives. 
1.  Deficiencies of the consumer sovereignty model 
The model of consumer sovereignty assumes that the only economic objective is  to 
maximise utility (or achieve the maximum fulfilment of preferences);  that this can best be 
done by  consumers choosing freely  among alternative bundles of goods;  that if any 
individual acquires more income and consumes more they  will be better off;  that society 
is  better off if some are able to  consume morc and  no-one is constrained to  consume less, 
but one cannot say  whether society  is  better or worse off if there is  redistribution and 
some consume more at the expense of others consuming less. 
There are numerous problems with the consumer sovereignty model.  Important among 
them are: 
- 1.  the way  distribution among households is  treated; 
- 2.  the blurring of individuals and  households; 
- 3.  the neglect of externalities; 
- 4.  the naive view of human psychology;  the fact  that other people's wellbeing enters 
into  individuals' objective function;  that people do  not only  maximise their own 
satisfaction;  that people and  societies have other goals besides maximising consumer 
welfare; 
- 5.  the fact  that only micro decisions can be  made  by  consumers,  yet the  more important 
ones are macro over which individual consumers have no  control. 
1.  Distribution of income!consumption. 
The consumer sovereignty approach to  welfare is  based on utilitarian philosophy, derived 
from the work of Bentham, James and  John Stuart Mill,  the basic idea being  that the 
ultimate goal of mankind is  to  maximise the  sum of human happiness.  The utilitarian 
objective could be consistent with highly egalitarian conclusions.  Assume  that there is 
diminishing marginal utility to consumption,  a common assumption applied to  the 
2 consumption of individual goods,  then if this extends not only  to  individJal goods but to 
consumption as  a whole, diminishing marginal utility of money,  income or consumption 
follows.  If  everyone has the same utility function,  utility maximisation will  be achieved 
with equal distribution of income.  This broadly was  the conclusion of Pigou.  The view of 
identical utility functions is  simplistic and somewhat naive:  clearly people have different 
needs,  so  that a handicapped person may  need more to  achieve the same utility as 
someone who  is able bodied; people in cold climates may  need more resources than those 
in hot climates;  the old or very young can have different needs from each other and 
middle generations.  These are differences which in principle one could identify and 
measure,  assuming that the same utility was  achieved by  people if and only  if their 
objective circumstances (their capabilities or functionings in Sen's terminology) were the 
same.  But in the  1930s Robbins made a much more radical and damaging claim:  he 
argued that in principle it was  impossible to  comp"re people's utilities because some 
people might be  much more sensitive than other,;,  so  that their marginal utility from 
additional income could be greater than others, even when their total  income was  much 
higher.  It followed that interpersonal comparisons of utility became impossible.  While one 
could state the conditions for  the  maximisation of individual utility, one could say  nothing 
about the desirability of redistribution of income among  individuals. 
The implications of this denial of interpersonal comparisons of utility are clearly  far 
reaching:  maximisation of consumer welfare becomes consistent with highly unequal 
income distribution, about which economists can say  nothing.  Yet the basis for the 
assumption of non-comparability across individuals is  flimsy;  it would seem as  reasonable 
to  assume - as  Pigou implicitly did - the  identity of utility functions among  individuals 
except where their conditions vary  in relevant respects.  This  is  the assumption made in 
medical practice, for example,  where people with similar conditions are assumed to  have 
similar needs. 
Alternative approaches to  wellbeing - relating  it  to objective circumstances (e.g. 
capabilities,  basic needs or some extemal psychologists'  assessment of wellbeing)  rather 
than to  the essentially subjective metric of 'utility' - permit interpersonal comparisons and 
hence conclusions about better and  worse distributions among  individuals. 
3 2.  Individuals versus households.  The agent of decision-making in welfare theory is  the 
individual who,  by  making unconstrained choices,  reveals her preferences and therefore 
her utility ranking 2  Yet we know that many decisions are made by  one person on behalf 
of others within the household.  These decisions may  be made by  a farseeing  and benign 
household 'dictator' whose only concern is  the wellbeing of members of the household; or 
they  may be made by  a less benign more self-concerned person who takes decisions about 
the nature of consumption and its distribution within the household in the light of their 
own interests.  In the second case - where household relations depend on power and 
bargaining within the household - actual consumption decisions made may not reflect the 
preferences of some household members,  so  'consumer sovereignty' does not reveal  each 
individual's preferences and therefore fails  even to  maximise individual welfare.  Evidence 
about consumption behaviour in developing countries increasingly supports the second 
view of household decision making (the power/bargaining model),  with male 
discrimination against women and against basic needs type expenditures compared with 
female decisions [see e.g. Behrman,  1995; Hoddinott and  Haddad,  1991;  Strauss and 
Thomas,  1996]. 
3.  Neglect of externalities. 
Consumption externalities are very large.  They not only  include the obvi'Jus negatives of 
neighbours' noise,  or positives of their beautiful gardens,  but the whole realm of (a) 
status and positional goods;  and (b)aspirations to  'keep up  with the Jones'.  Hence the 
value of any particular good to  any  individual is  in part socially determined.  It follows 
from this that much additional consumption does not confer any  (or proportionate) 
additional satisfaction. 
Status and positional goods.  Veblen pointed to  the importance of 'status' goods 
demonstrating individuals' ranking.  Hirsch analysed  'positional' goods (which would 
encompass status goods).  Positional goods are  goods whose value depends on the person 
being the only  (or among the few)  to  enjoy them.  For both these categories,  :C1re means 
better for particular individuals.  But  by  its nature satisfaction from  improved ranking is 
2  'The  individual guinea pig by  his  market  behaviour 
reveals his preference pattern'  (Samuelson,  1938). 
4 offset by  dissatisfaction from  worsening ranking for society as  a whole.  The whole tends 
to  form a zero sum game.  Hence a general  rise  in consumption will leave sati sfaction 
from positional and status goods unchanged. 
Keeping  up  with the Jones.  People wish to  function in ways they  regard as  socially 
appropriate.  Thus social standards as  well as  personal preferences determine their choice 
of foods,  clothes,  transport, entertainment etc. 3  It follows that with a general rise in 
incomes,  and new goods or habits that emerge reflecting this  rise,  there may  be very little 
additional satisfaction from following the  new  styles yet considerable unhappiness caused 
by  failing to  do  so.  For example,  in the  US  women are expected to  wear different clothes 
each day of the  week (possibly for a longer perioQ)  while  in  much of the  rest of the world 
it is  fine  to  wear the same clothes everyday so  long  as  they  are clean.  In poorer countries, 
high standards of cleanliness may not be exoected.  Since people suffer unhappiness from 
not obeying the  social  norms,  the utility gained from having seven sets of clothes in  the 
US  may  be little or no  greater than from having  tW:J sets  in the UK.  It follows that a 
good deal of extra consumption associated with general  increases in income does not 
confer additional satisfaction,  but,  in  the  context of generally increasing consumption, it is 
needed to  avoid  rising dissatisfaction associated with a fall  in relative standards. 
Consumption externalities are important because they challenge two  basic notions of the 
consumer sovereignty model:  tirst,  they  undermine the view that individual choice 
maximises utility because individuals fail  to  take into  account the  benefits or costs for 
others of their consumption;  secondly,  given the importance of positional goods and 
socially determined consumption standards,  general  increases  in consumption will  not 
increase welfare proportionately and may  sometimes not increase it at  all. 
4.  Human  motivation,  goals and satisfaction. 
There are a variety of problems with the  assumptions about motivation, goals and 
satisfaction that unccrlie the consumer sovereignty model. 
This  aspect  has  been exp10red  by  Layard .. 
5 The consumer sovereignty approach assumes that society's overriding aim is  to  maximise 
the total utility of individuals in society and  this is  best achieved by  individuals making 
unconstrained choices which maximise their own utility.  But people are social  beings and 
the wellbeing of others affects their own utility,  through what Sen has termed sympathy 
and commitment.  4  The  'philosophy  of the revealed preference approach essentially 
underestimates the fact that man is  social  animal and  his  choices are not rigidly bound by 
his own preferences only.' (Sen,  1982)  'The purely economic man is close to  being a 
social moron'. (Sen,  1973). 
Once non-personal goals are allowed for  in the individual utility function - sympathy and 
agency goals (i.e.  actions taken because of some general principles,  not for the uLility 
conferred by  a particular good) - then unconstrained individual consumer choice may not 
produce an optimum. 
Further,  psychologists and others have observed that choice itself - especially  if very 
large - may  cause unhappiness.' 
A much more important question is  whether utility maximisation is  accepted  as  the 
overriding goal of human activity.  Is  human  'happiness' (or  'utility') all  we  should aim 
for?  Does morality have no  place, except as  a contributor to  happiness?  Are other goals 
such as  environmental sustainability, protection of animals,  scholarship, only  to  be 
justified in so  far as  they  contribute to  human happiness? 
This is  a fundamental issue,  with enormously important implications for  our views of 
consumption and of the economic system more generally.  The consumer 
sovereignty futility  maximisation views underlie the growth/GNP maximisation approach 
to  development.  The UNDP's Human Development approach  is  based on  a rejection of 
4  Sympathy describes  the utilicy conferred on  individual  A 
by  consumption  of  someone  close  to  them  (B).  commitment  is 
where  a  person values  consumption of  B,  even  though it gives 
them  no utility,  because  their moral  position is  that  other 
peo?le matter  too  (Sen,  1982). 
S  See  also  Scitovsky,  1976. 
6 this.  The goal is  'human development' interpreted broadly  as  the enhancement of 
capabilities,  and associated specifically with particular basic capabilities, including the 
capability of being well nourished,  healthy and (-:ucated.  When interpreted as 
achievements (or junctionings in Sen's terminology) these are objective measurable 
phenomena (in contrast to  'utility'). They can be compared among people.  Basic 
capabilities should be achieved by  all  - with strong distributive implications, especially in 
poor societies.  According to  this view, consumption of goods and  services is a means to 
the achievement of functionings.  Some types of consumption are more efficient in this 
respect than others.  The HD approach can then assess  whether a particular pattern of 
consumption will contribute to  the  'lbjective or not.  This is  not possible with the utility 
approach,  since the act of consuming (or purchasing)  is  defined as  utility conferring: 
people have revealed  their preferences by  making  unconstrained cor:sumption decisions 
and that is  the end of the matter
6 
5.  The macro/micro issue 
When individuals make consumption choices,  they  are faced  with certain givens - the 
range of goods and  infrastructure available,  the consumption behaviour of others.  In  this 
context, they have a huge range of choice in  most countries, if  they  have the money.  (If 
they do  not then they  have very  little choice, especially since  so  little attention has been 
devoted to  developing poor people's products
7
). These choices are micro-choices.  People 
cannot make macro-choices through their individual consumption decisions.  Macro 
choices are  those determining the context of micro-choices:  e.g. whether imported goods 
are available;  the transport system;  enviromental standards;  the availability of guns etc. 
Macro choices are probably more important for wellbeing than micro-choices.  But these 
are taken elsewhere - through laws and regulations determined by  the political system,  as 
a result of international treaties,  or the unintended effect of a myriad of micro-decisions. 
Macro-decisions are affected by  votes and  by  lobbies.  Individual consumers are 
powerless to  intluence them.  Collectively, they  may,  however,  through campaigns.  The 
C  Strong externalities might  cause  some  amendment  to this 
position,  but  only  in a  preference-based context. 
See  James  and  Stewart,  1981. 
7 outcome of the political process that leads to  macro decisions is the  resu;t of numerous 
influences, with financial power typically being of substantial importance. 
All  the talk of maximising consumer welfare relates  to  the  micro-decisions.  Yet the macro 
decisions can affect welfare much more.  The macro choices are rarely explicitly on the 
agenda, except as  advanced by  specific pressure groups (e.g.  anti-smoking). 
A Human Development Repon on consumption should identify the macro-agenda,  as  it 
relates to  human development, as  well  as  exploring the implications of micro-decisions 
for HD.  Some relevant macro-issues are: 
- Research and  development related to poor people's products (appropriate products); 
- Regulations of HD-destroying products - e.g. guns;  smoking. 
- Local culture and imported products; 
- Appropriate safety (and other)  regulations for  poor societies; 
- Appropriate policies towards advertising and consumer information; 
- The regulation of informal sector products; 
- Information technology and  HD. 
This section of the paper has  shown the  flimsy  basis for  the  welfare conclusions based on 
consumer sovereignty.  The model  is  not appropriate for  an HD  approach;  it assumes a 
much narrower set of goals than the  HD  approach;  it  rejects the possibility of normative 
assessments of distributional aspects;  it ignores intra-household issues;  it does not deal 
with the macro-issues which are  of fundamental  importance to  human wellbeing, and 
provides no  basis for assessing them.  An HD  approach,  in contrast,  which assesses 
changes in consumption from the perspective  of the  impact on HD,  and in particular 
basic capabilities, can  contribute to each of these issues.  The next section will consider 
the  implications of a consumption driven approach  to  the  global economy for sustainable 
human development and wellbeing. 
II.  Globalization, capitalism and consumption 
Consumption is the driving  force of development in  modern capitalist economies.  All 
production is  undertaken either directly for  consumption or indirectly via investment 
8 goods which ale themselves wanted for the consumption goods they  will  produce.  Hence 
sustained growth of output rests on growth in consumption demand.  It is essential, 
therefore,  that consumption grows if growth of output and employment is  to  be sustained. 
In the high-income economies,  there  is,  in principle, a possibility of satiation as 
consumption grows. If  tastes  remained unchanged,  and there were no  new products and 
no  advertising, growth in consumption might slow down.  The richest groups would 
consume as  much as they want,  and still be able to save a great deal; poorer groups 
would catch up  with the life-styles of the rich and then they  too  could stabilise their 
consumption levels.  But this slowdown would be highly damaging to  a capitalist system, 
as  it would lead to  a slowdown in output and  employment growth unless offset by  growth 
in demands elsewhere.  With growing labour productivity,  growth in sales  is  essential just 
to  maintain employment levels. 
The need for output and consumption growth is felt not only at  an economy-wide level 
but also at a firm level.  Firm success depends on output growth,  with growth of profits 
dependent on growth of sales,  especially  in the  presence of economies of scale.  Hence 
there are  strong motives at both firm and economy  level  to  seek  to  expand markets, either 
by  expansion of sales domestically or abroad. 
A firm's competitive success in expanding sales depends either on successful product 
innovation or on undercutting rivals by  competitive pr;eing (or some combination).  Hence 
the imperative of output expansion also  leads firms to undertake research and 
development to  produce new/improved products and cost-cutting technologies.  In 
developed countries, the prime emphasis tends to  be on product development - in fact 
research shows  that at  least three-quarters of R.  and D.  is  devoted to product development 
[See e.g.  Mansfield,  1962; Schmookler,  1966;  Gustafson,  1962].  Hence in developed 
countries,  the need to  Increase/maintain market share  leads to  continuous product 
innovation.  This means that consumers face  never- ending changes  in products. 
The new/improved products generally tind a ready  market.  This is partly because they  are 
'better' products - i.e.  fultill needs  more efticiently or satisfactorily - e.g.  fuel  saving 
9 cars;  time-saving faxes;  more comfortable air-filled trainers.  But they  also  find a market 
because of the social determination of consumption demand discussed above.  Socially 
determined standards of dressing, entertaining,  travelling etc.  require the consumption of 
the new  products, while'  demonstration' and  'positional' effects lead all  those on lower 
incomes to  emulate the consumption standards of those above them on the income ladder. 
The net effect is to prevent satiation - indeed to  replace it by  ever present unsatisfied 
demand for most people, because as  soon as  people have attained given consumption 
objectives,  new ones come along, with the successive waves of product developments. 
Moreover,  new products render old ones obsolete;  the old cars no  long obey  the clean air 
restrictions;  film is  no  longer available for the old cameras;  the old washing machines 
can't be repaired ... 
In this dynamic process,  developing countries are mainly the  recipients of technological 
innovation rather than the innovators.  They  tend to  enter the product cycle as  consumers 
of Northern-designed products and as  cost-cutting producers of products designed in the 
North,  acquiring technology  and  often machinery from the  North.  A limited amount of 
innovation occurs in developing countries mainly devoted to  improving the efficiency of 
production in different locations,  but  there  is  extremely  little product innovation [Lall, 
Katz]. 
The South, of course,  receives not only  machinery,  but also consumption styles from the 
North.  The successive waves of consumption which ripple down the  income ladder of 
developed countries,  move almost as  fast  into the consumption markets of the South. 
Globalization - especially the communication revolution and  the spread of international 
travel,  world-wide television and  advertising - has  speeded up  the process.  The 
consumption patterns of the  elite in the South are very  similar to  that of the elite 
anywhere else.  The middle and working classes aspire to  the  same consumption standards 
(of course,  with S(V""e local differences)  as  middle and  working classes  in the North.  For 
the elite and  middle classes,  their actual consumption patterns may  be very  similar to 
those found in developed countries.  For the  working classes and  the  poor, consumption 
aspirations remain unavoidably unfulfilled, given their low incomes. 
10 Like consumers in the developed countries, the  model leads to  some objective 
improvements in conditions, but less increase in satisfaction,  since the moving target of a 
satisfactory consumption pattern can never be achieved.  In both developed and developing 
countries, neither the  increase in consumer satisfaction nor improvement in  objective 
conditions (capabilities) is proportionate to  the additional consumption defined in  terms of 
extra incomes or resource use.  The reason is  that so much of the extra consumption is 
related to  the  maintenance of socially determined standards rather than genuine 
improvements in the quality of life, while so  much of a consumers own psychic 
satisfaction depends on the person's relative position on the consumption ladder - which 
does not change so  long as  consumption inequality remains unchanged - rather than 
absolute levels of consumption. 
In developing countries - especially  among  the poor - there is a further problem.  The new 
products are designed to  suit the  income levels of the middle and  working class in  the 
developed countries, and  not for  the  poor of developing countries.  This  means that the 
consumption needs of the poor are not met,  while the  new  products cater to  middle and 
upper-income groups.  Hence distribution of well-being defined in terms of needs 
fulfilment may  worsen,  even  without any change in measured income distribution,  as  the 
middle classes can spend their incomes on  better products and  the poor cannot.  Indeed to 
the extent that the new  'high-income' products displace the  low-income products,  then the 
position of the poor becomes absolutely and not just relatively worse.  This can best be 
illustrated by  examples.  Suppose development in  airplanes leads  to  a more comfortable 
tlight and  lower costs;  the  wellbeing of those who  do  or might travel by  air will improve; 
that of the  rest of the world will  remain unchanged;  the distribution of wellbeing will 
become more unequal.  Now  suppose the improvements in  air travel  lead to  the 
abandonment of buses, to  which the poor had  access.  In this case,  the absolute as  well  as 
the relative position of the  poor will  worsen.  Usually,  such changes will  not affect the 
distribution of income.  They  would only  be  captured  with very  sophisticated measures 
that include different price indices for  rich and  poor which capture not only  price but also 
product quality/availability.  Some attempts have  been made to  develop  such indices to 
measure change in  welfare over time for  society  as  whole (but rarely).  I have  never seen 
any  attempt to  differentiate by  class within a society  in  such measures. 
11 The diagram illustrates the  impact of new  products on welfare in  rich  and  poor countries 
(or among rich and poor consumers),  showing different sets of indifference curves for 
rich and poor.  Product development from P to  P, iruproves the position of the rich 
consumer.  The position of the poor consumer is  unchanged in absolute terms  while 
worsening relatively so  long  as  the old product remains in production.  But if the old 
product disappears,  then the absolute position of the  poor consumer worsens (to a lower 
indifference curve) with the development of the new product. 
In practice,  the evidence suggests that many old products are withdrawn as  new products 
are developed,  partly because as  cl'nsumption switches away  from them,  there is loss of 
economies of scale,  and partly because they  become obsolete (as they use old materials 
and parts). 
To  summarise:  this section of the  paper has argued that the dynamics of the  world 
economy depend on a sustained and everlasting expansion in consumption, which is  based 
on the continuous development and sale of new and improved products.  The extra 
consumption does confer some additional consumer satisfaction,  but not proportionate to 
the extra incomes/resources embodied.  This view is  supported by empirical research into 
happiness in different societies and across time.  Using  measures like suicides,  mental 
breakdown,  crimes and questionnaires all  such work points to  the conclusion that more 
consumption does not raise happiness (certainly not proportionately).  The consumption 
driven model of the world economy thus leads to  a position in which:  (a) neither 
satisfaction nor objective conditions of consumers increase proportionately with incomes; 
(b)the needs of the poor are left out in product development and  their position tends  to 
worsen  relatively and absolutely.  Moreover,  the first part of this note showed that one 
cannot appeal  to  economic theory  to justify the  system in terms of 'welfare maximisation' 
since  the  links between consumption and welfare  are  as  fragile  and  full  of holes as  a 
cobweb. 
Not only  is it impossible to  justify the  model in  terms of human development or 
satisfaction it also  has  some critical  negative effects in  terms of environmental 
sustainability.  The endless  rise in consumption leads  to  ever increasing  use of world 
12 resources,  with well-known implications for energy shortages/ excess carbon dioxide, 
global wanning etc. 
III.  Can one devise alternatives? 
The first two  sections of this note have pointed to  serious problems with the organisation 
of the world economic system:  its basic engine - the continuous expansion of consumption 
- is not viable in the long run because of its  resource using implications; nor is it justified 
in the short tenn in tenns of its effects in improving people's satisfaction or capabilities. 
While it does make a contribution to  both these objectives,  the contribution is  not 
proportionate to  the resources used,  especially as  people become richer.  Hence it is 
important to  search for alternatives.  But beto[e doing so,  it is  necessary  to  point to  some 
substantial virtues of the present global  model. 
The consumption led economy has  resulted in continuous technical  change,  with huge 
improvements in the efficiency of resource use (e.g. as  measured by  labour/output or 
energy /output ratios).  Higher productivity and  new products have produced greatly 
improved nutrition and  large medical advances;  life expectation has more than doubled in 
many countries.  For many  life is  much more comfortable and interesting than it was  a 
century ago.  Improved standards have not been confined to  developed countries,  but have 
been shared by  the majority of  mankind.  Moreover,  the  sharply  diminished returns to 
extra consumption appear most notably among elite consumption standards and the middle 
classes in developed countries.  The poor in  both rich and poor societies could  still enjoy 
considerable improvements in  their lives if they  had  access  to  more goods and  services. 
The problem with the system arises because it  depends on ever growing consumption 
levels among high income groups - the people tor whom extra consumption is  not 
particularly desirable;  and  the  higher consumption among  these groups  creates new 
demands among everyone else.  The key  question then is  whether it is possible to 
slowdown the system at  the upper-income level (for shorthand at the level  of 'elite 
consumption') without causing the whole system to  seize up.  This could be achieved 
without a slackening of world output growth,  though a redirection of output away  from 
the elite towards the poor in developed and  developing countries and  towards  the 
13 fulfilment of mher important objectives,  such as  environmental,  social and  educational 
ones.  There would be enough demand  to  generate rising output and  employment from 
these areas and from raising the  standards of the poor for a considerable time-span (say 
the next fifty years).  Eventually,  there might be a general satiation and  the need to 
reorganise the world economy towards a stationary,  replacement, production and 
consumption equilibrium. This would require huge changes in  the organisation of the 
world economy and society  - although in historical terms it would amount to  no  more 
than a return the centuries of experience before the  industrial revolution.  But this is a 
problem for the late 21st century, not one we need face  today.  The immediate problem 
today  is  to  redirect resources away  from additional elite consumption, which would 
include that of the elite throughout the world and the upper middle classes in  developed 
countries towards the poor in developed and  developing countries and  towards social 
goods. 
The problem is  to  identify technical mechanisms and political conditions which would 
bring about the  required  redirection.  While the problem is partly technical,  much the 
greater element is political.  Technically, what is  required is  similar to  the  'Redistribution 
with growth'  strategy developed in the  1970s,  but aoplied to  the  whole world and not just 
developing countries. 
8 Somehow the extra resources gained by  the elite through growth 
need to  be  redistributed to  the  poor and  to  a set of environmental,  social and  educational 
objectives (for shorthand 'good society'  objectives).  The  redistribution could  be achieved, 
technically,  by  swingeing taxation on the  rich,  but  thi c  might act as  such a disincentive 
that it reduced the growth of the  system as  a whole.  (This was  always a difficulty with 
the original 'RWG' strategy). Other alternatives would be very heavy  consumption or 
expenditure taxes, or restrictions on earnings at  the upper end.  Finally,  a voluntary 
solution might be sought,  with the elite persuaded to  'downsize', to  work less long hours 
etc. 
Politically, it is obvious that none of these  'solutions' are  plausible at the present 
conjuncture,  when the trend  is  towards higher inequality,  more and more grossly high 
p  See  Chenery et al"  1974, 
14 salary levels in high income economies and  reduced  income tax  rates,  on the  'grounds' of 
incentives and efficiency.  Moreover,  there is also  a trend  towards privatisation and 
against state activity, yet for the  'good society'  goals,  state or community expenditures 
may  be essential.  The trend in  fact  is  precisely  the opposite of that needed which is 
scarcely surprising because there would not be  such a clear problem were this not so. 
Hence while we can point to plausible 'macro' solutions to  the problem,  we  cannot 
realistically have any  expectations of their realisation.  Moreover,  any  solution needs to 
start in the richest economy, where new  consumption standards are set - which today 
means the US.  And the  US  appears  less  likely  than almost any other society to  accept that 
there is a problem or that any  of the possible solutions are acceptable. 
Hence more 'micro' solutions have  to  be  sought in  the  short run,  with the hope that this 
will pave the way eventually for more macro solutions as  the  unsatisfactory nature of the 
present pattern of growth becomes increasingly apparent. 
Elements of the 'micro' approach include: 
- documenting and publicising what is  wrong with the present system;  generating 
indicators of people's level of satisfaction/happiness and of their changing objective 
circumstances over time and  among different segments of society. 
- exploring, documenting and publicising  experiments in alternative life-styles,  and 
assessing levels of happiness  and changing capabilities associated  with these alternatives. 
Alternatives to  be investigated include:  people who  have  'down-sized'; communities who 
are  seeking alternative patterns of living; different life styles in  traditional communities. 
- identifying the environmental implications of the existing system and of alternatives; 
- reforming the  system of indirect taxation  to  increase taxation on elite products and 
pursue green objectives. 
The doable micro-agenda may  appear weak when confronted with  the  magr;i~, je of the 
issue.  But it itself represents a m~or task,  and  a necessary  beginning to  tackling the 
macro-issue. 
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